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April 5, 2013.1. INTRODUCTION
In most professional services the parties to a potential trans-
action are unequal in the knowledge needed to make a good
decision. It is a well-established principle of economics that
markets which suﬀer from such asymmetric information are
imperfect, with the consequences of exposing the uninformed
to potential exploitation, depressing the prices that purchasers
are willing to pay for a service, and discouraging many trans-
actions that would otherwise be desirable to sellers or buyers,
with the typical consequence that service quality is reduced
(Akerloﬀ, 1970).
Health markets pose a heightened version of the problems
of asymmetric information. Where patients are not able to
judge the quality of inputs, competition can lead to a combi-
nation of exploitative “rent-seeking” (i.e., revenue gouging)
by unscrupulous providers and “a race to the bottom” (also
known as a “market for lemons”) in which prices are driven
down at the expense of quality (Akerloﬀ, 1970; Arrow, 1963,
1985). If purchasers could know the quality being oﬀered, they
could forego counterfeit, substandard and ineﬀective goods
and services, while paying more for better quality ones, there-
by providing stronger incentives for good performance. Good
quality providers would also be advantaged by measures to
overcome information asymmetries, as they would be able to
better market their services (Brhlikova et al., 2011; McLeod
& Wilsmore, 2002). These features apply most strongly to
curative medicine (where the beneﬁts are “private” to the pur-
chaser) and less to the “public goods” of prevention and
health promotion (where the beneﬁts are not limited to the
immediate recipient and it is harder to exclude non-payers,71with the consequence that governments of necessity are more
involved). We therefore focus most intensively on quality
and trust issues around “private” goods.
In order to overcome the market imperfection imposed by
asymmetric information some kind of mechanism is needed
to give consumers an accurate picture of what they are buying.
Formal theorists in economics have concluded that markets in
these goods have great diﬃculty achieving an eﬃcient market
unless providers are legally liable for their work (Dulleck &
Kerschbamer, 2006; Dulleck, Kerschbamer, & Sutter, 2011).
Eﬀective enforcement of liability, together with other aspects
of state regulation commonly are weak in Low and Middle In-
come Countries (LMICs) characterized by standards of gover-
nance at or below the global medium (which we refer to as
“undergoverned”) (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2006). 1
Nonetheless many of these countries do ﬁnd ways to overcome
their information asymmetry problems. 2
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vision of services by a well-organized public sector, other gov-
ernment regulations, industry standards, monitoring by a well-
known and trusted franchise (such as a church), professional
norms, the impact of international donors or international
non-governmental organizations (INGOs), or even “out-
come-contingent” contracts (where the buyer does not pay un-
til the outcome of the service is known).
When such mechanisms are socially embedded they are
“institutions”. Social scientists who study development are
clear that institutions are critical to economic trajectories
(North, 1990) and that optimal ones do not necessarily emerge
by themselves (Conning & Udry, 2007). These institutions
encompass formal and informal societal and organizational
arrangements, incentives, rules, norms, and values that shape
the behavior of market actors. Sometimes a mechanism, such
as decentralization, has come to be socially valued for its own
sake. Such valuation is what makes it an institution, and this
institutionalization frequently is essential in making the mech-
anism eﬀective. A better understanding of these institutions
and their eﬀectiveness in diﬀerent contexts can provide impor-
tant insights into how best to inﬂuence market participants to
act in the public interest.
Although the health market is considered the quintessen-
tial example of asymmetric information (Arrow, 1963), it is
far from the only one. Other service sectors that similarly
impact the welfare of the poor in LMICs and that also
are troubled by asymmetric information problems include
veterinary medicine, education, agricultural credit, and the
civil service.
In this article we review what is known about institutional
solutions to the asymmetric information problem throughout
the preceding range of professional services in poor undergov-
erned countries. The organizing “lens” through which we ﬁrst
report on these usually separate literatures is that of human
health, but the lessons are much broader and only half the evi-
dence we cite is speciﬁc to health. We cover a range of sectors,
because we want to stress both that the literature of each
makes unique contributions and that the regularities in the evi-
dence come out powerfully only when examined compara-
tively.
The questions guiding our systematic search and review of
the empirical literature are as follows:
 What institutions have been used to mediate relationships
among service providers and recipients?
 How are these institutions helping to assure recipients of
the quality for which they believe they are paying?
 What is the evidence of the eﬀectiveness of such institutions
in diﬀerent LMIC contexts, particularly “undergoverned”
ones?
We are most interested in institutions that enable individual
components or a service market as a whole to deliver eﬀective
products and services that are accessible to and used by the
poor. The eﬀectiveness question involves quality (both how
to ensure that the services provided meet minimum standards
and how to provide incentives for improvements) and trust
(how to assure the purchasers of a product or service that they
are getting the quality they are being promised) (Gilson, 2006).
Accessibility questions concern the arrangements in place for
the needs of the poorest to be met and can lead into issues
about resources, insurance, and subsidy schemes. It is not fea-
sible to address both of these broad areas in a single article, so
we focus on the institutions that impact eﬀectiveness (and
therefore information asymmetry) and discuss accessibility
only as they aﬀect it.2. INSTITUTIONS
North (1990) stipulates that institutions set the “rules of the
game” for the markets within which organizations operate.
Institutional sociologists use amore inclusive deﬁnition of insti-
tutions—those regularities in behavior that are valued for their
own sake, i.e., have become “institutionalised” (Powell &
DiMaggio, 1991). For us “institutions” encompass both—at
the market level, there are “macro”/contextual “rules of the
game”, whereas at a more “micro” level there are formal policy
instruments applied to govern the operation of speciﬁc parts of
the market, and less formal values that produce and are repro-
duced by the ways in which particular organizations behave
((Kherallah & Kirsten, 2002), following Williamson, 1985).
Figure 1 illustrates our causal model linking institutions to
professional service outcomes. A particular society will be char-
acterized by its prevailing economic, political, and social fea-
tures. Many of these “macro” attributes are not subject to
change in the short-term—for example because of resource con-
straints, international and local distributions of power, or cul-
tural values. Such temporarily “ﬁxed” features set the context
within which services for the poor are operating at present and
constrain the “paths” along which they are likely to develop.
There is a considerable range of “micro” mechanisms which
exist or might be introduced at the sectoral or organizational
level that could be used to overcome the acute information
asymmetry problem stemming from a “macro” context of
mixed market, poverty, and weak governance—the one on
which this article focuses. In order to unpack the “micro”
institutions that might be used, we distinguish between (i) com-
petence or capacity to meet a need, (ii) eﬀort applied, and (iii)
assurance of accountability for the outcome, as well as (iv)
ways in which all of these are signaled to other parties in a pro-
spective transaction. 3 Competence refers here to the posses-
sion of the technical skills and knowledge required to
provide an eﬀective service or intervention. Eﬀort is the exer-
tion of mental or physical energy—for instance to determine
what is wrong with a patient and to deliver an appropriate
care package. (Analytically, eﬀort includes, but cannot be re-
duced to, the incentives that often induce it.) Accountability
reﬂects the idea that “progress towards goals, commitments,
or responsibilities are assessed, and those responsible for ac-
tion in these areas are held to account in some public fashion”
(Collins, Coates, & Szekeres, 2008) (Brinkerhoﬀ, 2004).
Competence and eﬀort clearly are important to positive out-
comes, but potential clients will not pay for them if they do
not know they exist. Thus “signalling,” through the provision
of an observable and credible cue is important as a way of
communicating and assuring the presence of quality features
that recipients may be seeking.
These “micro” governance mechanisms may gradually be-
come valued for their own sake (i.e., become “institutional-
ized”) if the context permits them to function well, in which
case they will achieve a still stronger level of inﬂuence on pro-
vider and client behavior.
Finally, it is provider and client interactions, as shaped by
the prevailing “macro” and “micro” institutions, which deter-
mine the outcomes of the professional service.
Thismodel drives the structure of this article. After setting out
our methods in the next section, in Section 4 we discuss the so-
cio-economic background and the “macro” institutions that
provide the context for service provision. The subsequent three
Sections 5–7 then present the diﬀerent sets of “micro” mecha-
nisms driving provider competence, eﬀort, and accountability,
respectively. In Section 8 we return to the ways in which path
dependence has shaped “micro” choices in particular countries,
Table 1. Macro institutions shaping service markets with information asymmetry
Institution (& section of discussion) Actor(s) initiating/upholding Observed eﬀect of institution Sector Region Type of evidence
Governance (4a) State ++ C, E, H, V AL 1^**, 1**, 1 *
Markets (4b) Econ./State +/ E, H, V AL 2^**, 5**, 2*
Income/capita (4c) Econ./State ++ H AL 2*
Education (4c) State ++ H AL 2*
“Social capital” (4d) Society + H AL 1*
Inequality (4d, 7b) Econ./Society  C, E, H, O, V AL 3^**, 2**, 1*
Patronage (4d) Society/State  C, H, V AL 2^**, 2*
Notes: Column 1 gives the section of this article where the supporting evidence is presented and discussed, #4 the sectors that it covers, #5 the regions of
the world to which the research pertains, and #6 the type of study. The codes are as follows:
Service sectors: Agriculture (A), general Civil Service (C), Education (E), Health (H), societal Organisatons (O), and Veterinary Medicine (V).
Regions: All LMICs (AL), Africa (AF), Central Asia (CA), East Asia (EA), Europe (EU), Latin America (LA), Middle East (ME), North America (NA),
Oceana (OC), South Asia (SA), and South-East Asia (SE).
Study types (preceded by cited number of that type of study):
^**Rigorous systematic reviews (including studies using experimental methods).
**Other peer reviewed literature reviews supported by multiple empirical studies.
* Single high quality pieces of research (judged by the standards of the relevant discipline).
Figure 1. Causal path from context through institutions to service outcomes.
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that might shape service delivery in the weakly regulated service
delivery markets of undergroverned LMICs are indicated in the
Tables 1–4, which also provide a synopsis of what our literature
review reveals about their relative eﬀectiveness.3. METHODS
We used a systematic literature search to identify evidence
addressing the research questions outlined above. Our primarysearch objective was to identify peer-appraised review papers.
The search terms and engines employed are detailed in the
Appendix and were used to identify research on LMICs 4 con-
cerned with institutions in general, and institutions in the ﬁelds
of curative health, agriculture (especially credit), education,
general government, and veterinary services.
In several ways, however, this article is not a “systematic re-
view” in the strictest sense (Waddington & White, 2012). If we
were to have tried to evaluate all published articles that relate
to our questions across multiple sectors we would have faced
an impossibly large number. We thus did a systematic search
Table 3. Micro institutions shaping service markets with information asymmetry: Eﬀort
Institution
(& section of discussion)
Actor(s)
initiating/upholding
Observed eﬀect
of institution
Sector Region Type of evidence
Incentives to reward eﬀort—hiring, promotions,
good postings, salaries,
bonuses, renewable accreditation
State (6ai) Weak A, E, H AL, AF, SA 2^**, 1**, 1*
Donors (6aii) Strong/mixed H AL 2*
Value-based NGOs (6dvii) Strong H, V AF, SA 4*
Direct payments in general (5b) Users ++ H, V AL, AF, SA, SE 5**, 4*
Direct payments to individuals (6ci,ii) Users +/ H, V AL,NA 4^**, 2**
Direct payments to individuals
contingent on outcome (6cii)
Users ++ H, V AF, EA 1**, 3*
Direct payments to organizations (6d) Users ++ C, E, H AL, AF, EA 5^**, 1**, 2**
Social franchising (6e) Users Unclear H AL 4^**, 1**
Contracting—Access (6e) Donors, State ++ H, V AL, EU, AF 2^**, 1**, 1*
Contracting—Quality Donors (6e) Mixed E, H AF, SA 2^**, 2**, 1*
Value-based NGOs (6dvii) ++ H, V AF, SA 4*
See notes at Table 1.
Table 2. Micro institutions shaping service markets with information asymmetry: Competence
Institution (& section of discussion) Actor(s)
initiating/upholding
Observed eﬀect
of institution
Sector Region Type of evidence
Pro/Professional qualiﬁcations (5a) anti/(5b, 6) State Mixed H, V A, E, H AF, SA AF, SA 4* 3^**, 1*
Professional accreditation (5b) State + E, H AL, AF 1^**, 2**, 1*
Regulation of malpractice State (5c) Weak E, H AL, AF, SA 1**^,3**, 4*
Priv. ﬁrms (5c) + H AL 1**
Peers (6diii) Weak H, V AL, AF, SA 1^**, 1**, 1*
Use of para-professionals (5d) State +/Weak H, A AL, LA 1^**, 2*
Private +/ E, V AL, AF, SA 2^**, 2**
NGOs ++ H, V AF 2*
Visible ongoing training and supervision (5e) Service providers ++ A, H, V AL, AF 3^**, 2**, 7*
See notes at Table 1.
Table 4. Micro institutions shaping service markets with information asymmetry: Accountability
Institution
(& section of discussion)
Actor(s)
initiating/upholding
Observed
eﬀect of institution
Sector Region Type of evidence
Devolution (7ai) State, society  A, C, E, H, V AL, AF 3^**, 5**, 3*
Deconcentration with participation (7aii) State, society ++ E, H AL, AF, LA, SE 6^**, 2**, 3*
Participation under equality (7b) Providers, society ++ E, H, O AL, AF 1^**, 4**, 1*
Participation under inequality (7ai, 7b) Providers, society 
Published performance information (7c) Providers, society + H AL, CA 2^**, 1*
Path dependent solutions (8) State, society ++ H AF, EA, LA, SA 4**, 8*
See notes at Table 1.
74 WORLD DEVELOPMENTfor post-1999 peer-reviewed journal surveys of high-quality
empirical studies on institutions and management mechanisms
in each area. Of course, some of these surveys were as recent as
2012 and all of them covered research done well before 2000,
so the dates of empirical studies eﬀectively are unbounded.
In addition, we accepted the methodological standards ap-
plied by peers in the sectors and social science disciplines in
which the surveys were published. At no time have we ex-
cluded from our discussion any of the ﬁndings of these surveys
or studies cited by them. Unlike the standard “systematic re-
view”, however, we have supplemented the ﬁndings uncovered
by our surveys with other individual studies of which we wereaware when they would help to frame or extend or ﬁll gaps in
survey ﬁndings. This was particularly important given the
range of sectors and disciplines on which we were drawing,
for the scope of surveys varies between them and in many
there is a bias against research reported in books. These addi-
tional materials were never used to contradict the empirical
ﬁndings presented in the surveys, however, and are clearly
identiﬁed in our references.
Because we have been particularly inclusive with regard to
evidence, we have made a special eﬀort to be transparent
about its character. In this article, evidence which takes the
form of a rigorous systematic review (including studies using
INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS TO THE ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION PROBLEM IN HEALTH 75experimental methods) is annotated with ^**; evidence from a
peer reviewed literature review supported by several empirical
studies is denoted with **; and evidence which derives from a
single high quality piece of research (judged by the standards
of the relevant discipline) is annotated with *. Articles with less
substantial evidence bear no annotation and those that ad-
vance a probable but weakly evidenced hypothesis are anno-
tated with a . In addition in the summary tables we show
the service sector and the region from which the evidence is
drawn.
Finally, we have used the concepts of the New Institutional
Economics to frame our analysis. This body of theory is
behavioral and inter-disciplinary, drawing heavily on organi-
zational sociology as well as comparative political science
and economic history (Williamson, 1990). 5 The NIE frame-
work is highly compatible with the materials we found and
we were able to use it without excluding or discounting any
of the empirical results. At the same time the NIE facilitated
teasing out some of the subtleties in the ﬁndings and making
them accessible to those concerned with the design and man-
agement of service professions.4. GOVERNANCE, MARKETS, AND CONTEXT
(a) The governance context
Services are aﬀected by the quality of the state’s governance
institutions, which regulate them and hold them accountable.
A great many LMICs suﬀer in this regard, leading us to focus
in this article on what we refer to as “undergoverned” states,
reﬂecting particularly problems with corruption and ineﬀective
public services (Kaufmann et al., 2006)*. Operationally, this
has two important consequences. First, we are considering
LMIC settings in which the state in practice does not provide
free basic services to the poor or does so to only a limited ex-
tent. This aspect of the context is fundamental to the informa-
tion asymmetry problem, for it means that the “principal”
ordering services from the organizational “agent” is the recipi-
ent (client), not the government (Pratt & Zeckhauser, 1985). In
such a setting the ideal state would create an institutional con-
text within which other parties are able to buy and sell services
of known quality. Second, our focus on countries where gov-
ernance institutions are not strong means that state regulation
of the formal and informal markets that have grown up to
provide services is weak and sometimes dysfunctional. Conse-
quently, weak governance and poor regulation generally are
associated with lower health outcomes (Matsubayashi, Peters,
& Rahman, 2009)^** (Balabanova et al., 2011)** (Knowles &
Owen, 2010)*.
(b) Markets
Because most poor people live in the generally undergov-
erned states of South Asia, China, and Africa, our review fo-
cuses on the features and imperfections of a “market”, rather
than of the “private” or “public” sectors. In many LMICs for-
mal and informal patient–provider ﬁnancial transactions are
pervasive in the public as well as the private sectors. A number
of countries have established eﬀective government-run health
systems that are not reliant on market relations, but these
are not the places where most of the “poorest of the poor” live.
Generally, someone who needs medical treatment undergov-
erned LMICs will have to pay someone for it. For example,
in India less than 25% of rural health services are publicly
provided (and even they usually involve informal payments)(Banerjee & Duﬂo, 2006; Berlan & Shiﬀman, 2011)^**. Like-
wise the non-state sector provides the overwhelming majority
of curative services in Bangladesh (Balabanova et al., 2011)**.
In the same way, animal health services in tropical Africa
moved from overwhelmingly free government provision before
1980 to almost universally compensated services by 1990
(Leonard, 2000b)**. 6 In undergoverned states the distinction
between “public” and “private” is more one of ownership
and supervision, not of whether money is being exchanged.
A market is present in both the “public” and “private” health
sectors (Bloom, Standing, & Joshi, 2009; Ferrinho, Lerberghe,
Fronteira, Hipolito, & Biscaia, 2004)** (Ahuja et al., 2000; Jan
et al., 2005)* and it is more useful to look at variations in the
market than in the formal, nominal attributes of the providers.
This is fundamental. Most often it is the context and mecha-
nisms that are determining performance, not the “owner”.(c) The economic and educational macro-institutional context
The eﬀectiveness of development services is deeply shaped
by their economic and social context as well—not only the dif-
ﬁculty of the problems they must solve but also the human and
material resources they are able to apply to them and the soci-
etal (“macro”) institutions within which they are held to ac-
count. For example human health in poor countries usually
rises with per capita income and then evens out at industrial-
ized country levels. Similarly it improves with a population’s
education, which increases the capacity of service employees,
the ability of the public to access and use beneﬁts well, and cre-
ates the skills with which citizens can hold providers account-
able. Further, within the market the ability of people to engage
in mutually beneﬁcial exchanges depends on the informal insti-
tutions of society that enable people to cooperate with and
trust one another (Evans, 2009; Knowles & Owen, 2010)*.
The context of LMICs is that in addition to low per capita in-
comes, average levels of education usually are lower (even if
they have improved signiﬁcantly over recent years).(d) The social context
Informal institutions of social capital (trust) can substitute
for weak formal ones and there is greater variability among
poor countries in this regard than there is with regard to gov-
ernance (Knowles & Owen, 2010)*. Societal inequalities in as-
sets or social status and local governance structures dominated
by patronage also inhibit the ability of governments to provide
eﬀective development services to the poor (Berlan & Shiﬀman,
2011; Molyneux, Atela, Angwenyi, & Goodman, 2012)^**
(Evans, 2009; Leonard & Marshall, 1982; Leonard & et al.,
2010)*
(e) Contextual “givens” and path dependency
None of the aspects of the macro-institutional context of
service delivery are easily changed in the near term. General
civil service reform, for example, is politically very diﬃcult
to achieve and signiﬁcant change occurs only episodically
(Batley, 2004; Bebbington & McCourt, 2007; Heredia &
Schneider, 2002; March & Olsen, 1984; Silbermann, 1993)**
(World Bank, 2008)*. Save in special moments of historical
opportunity these macro institutions are givens, a part of the
context. Thus those committed to eﬀective delivery of develop-
ment services must ﬁnd context-speciﬁc ways to work with the
institutions they have, making the structure and micro-institu-
tional nature of services highly path dependent (Bloom,
76 WORLD DEVELOPMENTChampion, Lucas, Peters, & Standing, 2008; Bloom et al.,
2009; Grindle & Thomas, 1991; Leonard, 2010)**.5. THE MICRO-INSTITUTIONS OF POLICY INTER-
VENTION: COMPETENCE
(a) Professional qualiﬁcations
In undergoverned LMICs the quality of health care oﬀered
to poor and even middle-income patients is very often seri-
ously deﬁcient (Das, Hammer, & Leonard, 2008)** and this
problem has been documented in the other, professional ser-
vice sectors as well (Leonard, 1977)*. This problem often is
traceable to lack of knowledge. For example, teachers cannot
transmit information they do not have and health practitio-
ners cannot diagnose diseases or perform procedures of which
they have no understanding. Thus the institutions that provide
professional qualiﬁcations, train to refresh and upgrade
knowledge, and regularly supervise practice are all critical
components of the quality of a service. In this regard it is
unsurprising that in rural Tanzania the quality of care oﬀered
by a clinic was associated with the presence of an MD (Mliga,
2000)*, and MDs in Delhi demonstrate superior competence to
those with lesser qualiﬁcations in both the public and private
sectors (Das & Hammer, 2007)*. Cameroonian villagers who
feared they had a serious ailment bypassed cheap clinics to
reach much more expensive ones known for their special com-
petence (Leonard, 2009)* and Ugandan dairy producers who
would not pay the higher fees of a fully qualiﬁed veterinarian
for routine care were willing to do so when surgery was re-
quired (Koma, 2000)*. As we will see below, however, the
management necessary to turn higher competence into more
eﬀective service is not always provided. (For example, Das
et al., 2012* found only small diﬀerences in clinical quality be-
tween the trained and untrained in rural India.)
(b) Professional accreditation
Certiﬁcation of qualiﬁcations at the point of entry to a pro-
fession is one of the few areas in which eﬀective regulation in
LMICs is common and institutionalized (Patouillard, Good-
man, Hanson, & Mills, 2007)^** (Ensor & Weinzierl, 2007)**
(Kumaranayake, Lake, Mujinja, Hongoro, & Mpembeni,
2000)*. This is broadly true across the professions—for physi-
cians, veterinarians, teachers, etc—particularly when they are
employed in government-supported settings (Rose, 2006)**.
In many countries, however, diﬀerences in qualiﬁcations are
signaled to the public more by the organizational setting in
which practice is taking place and less well for diﬀerences be-
tween the individuals within them—a point to which we will
return later.
(c) Regulation of practice/malpractice
In the undergoverned LMICs on which we are focusing, the
regulation of competence and eﬀectiveness in day-to-day prac-
tice generally is weak or non-existent (Rose, 2006)**. Hence,
the strength of a state’s formal institutions is closely related
to the health status of its population (Knowles & Owen,
2010)*. For example, corruption is negatively correlated with
health indicators and is a serious concern in the procurement
of pharmaceuticals (Kohler & Baghdadi-Sabeti, 2011)**. Reg-
ulatory weaknesses are more likely in undergoverned states
and are an important part of the institutional context within
which their health and development services operate. In manycountries most rural private pharmacies have no staﬀ with any
kind of professional qualiﬁcation on the premises, despite for-
mal regulations requiring their presence (Bloom et al., 2009)**
(Bett, Machila, Gathura, McDermottd, & Eisler, 2004; Ensor
& Weinzierl, 2007)*. Use of the law to control medical mal-
practice in India is judged ineﬀective (Peters & Muraleedha-
ran, 2008)* although it is more evident in China.
(d) Paraprofessionals
The rural poor and especially those who live in remote areas
have particular diﬃculty obtaining services because the better
educated providers are reluctant to live there and when they
do so are frequently absent from their posts (Banerjee & Du-
ﬂo, 2006)^**. Professionals also often are culturally distant
from the rural poor, which detracts further from their motiva-
tion to serve them well. Even veterinarians, who are much
more attracted to rural life than teachers or physicians, are
reluctant to live with pastoralists. As a result, the posting to
remote areas of fee-charging staﬀ with only basic but expert-
provided external training can lead to substantial improve-
ments in service delivery, because they may be culturally better
attuned with their clients than highly qualiﬁed professionals
and provide them with better real access to assistance for rel-
atively simple but serious and endemic problems. Such was the
logic underlying the “bare-foot doctors” initiative of China’s
Cultural Revolution and the community health workers pro-
posed in WHO’s Alma Ata Declaration of 1978. Initially
many of these workers were community-supported rather than
fee charging, but over time they have evolved toward the lat-
ter. The reduction in livestock mortality rates of African pas-
toralists through the deployment of fee-charging Community
Animal Health Workers with limited training is particularly
clear (Catley et al., 2004; Peeling & Holden, 2004)**. Similar
success with community (human) health workers has been re-
ported for a range of tasks in LMICs (Chopra, Munro, Lavis,
Vist, & Bennett, 2008)^** (Tendler, 1997)*.
The problem with the use of minimally trained service staﬀ
is not with the staﬀ themselves, for they can be highly eﬀective
at preventive and simple curative human and veterinary med-
icine as well as at agricultural extension. Private schools whose
staﬀ lack teaching certiﬁcates also often out-perform govern-
ment ones whose teachers have better formal qualiﬁcations,
even when serving the poor (Patrinos, Barrera-Osorio, &
Gua´queta, 2009)^** (Rose, 2006)**. Nor is the problem that
they or their organizations are charging for their services
and that they therefore are in the market. The issue instead
is that the training they receive must be well done and they
must continue to receive eﬀective support, supervision, and
updating throughout their service lives. In other words they
must be backed by institutionalized “organizational intelli-
gence” (Goodman et al., 2007; Patrinos et al., 2009; Peters,
El-Saharty, Siadat, Janovsky, & Vujicic, 2009; Shah, Brieger,
& Peters, 2010)^** (Catley et al., 2004; Peeling & Holden,
2004)** (Leonard, 1977; Ly, 2000)*. If these staﬀ succeed in
being absorbed into the regular civil service—as frequently is
their ambition—and their management is neglected, their
eﬀectiveness can drop signiﬁcantly (Leonard, 1977, 1991)*.
On the other hand, when they remain in the private voluntary
sector and are subject to strong management—as often has
been the case with missions in Africa—they can outperform
government facilities with better trained staﬀ (Ly, 2000; Mliga,
2000)*. However if they drift away from the organizations that
trained them and become wholly autonomous, as has occurred
in many countries, they can become no better than untutored
drug sellers, cut oﬀ from professional support and supervision
INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS TO THE ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION PROBLEM IN HEALTH 77and with documented problems with safety, eﬀectiveness of
treatment, and costs (Basu et al., 2012)^** (Bloom et al.,
2008)**.
(e) Visible training and supervision
When strong management is visible to the consuming public
it reduces information asymmetry by “signalling” the quality of
the work actually done by the minimally-qualiﬁed staﬀ and
thereby increases clients’ willingness to pay for more of the ser-
vice they provide. Thus in Senegal pastoralists were willing to
buy more preventive animal health measures from the Commu-
nity Animal Health Workers of a Lutheran mission that pro-
vided strong support and supervision than they were from a
similar government service in a neighboring area (Ly, 2000)*.
Similarly, a study in Cameroun demonstrated that even the
poor were willing to pay more for quality medical service when
they believed they had a condition that justiﬁed it (Leonard,
2000a, 2009)*. In a variety of professions there is a demon-
strated willingness to pay for more of the services provided
by well-supported and supervised, minimally-qualiﬁed provid-
ers, when the quality they are oﬀering is relevant to the pur-
chaser’s needs (Tooley & Dixon, 2006)** (Koma, 2000)*.6. MICRO-INSTITUTIONS: EFFORT
Quality of service provision depends on eﬀort as well as raw
competence. In LMICs there often is a substantial gap be-
tween what a practitioner is capable of doing and knows
s/he should do in treating a patient and what s/he does in prac-
tice. This gap between routine performance and what is done
under the eyes of a supervisor or researcher is known as the
“Hawthorne eﬀect” and has been clearly demonstrated among
medical clinicians in Tanzania (Leonard & Masatu, 2006;
Leonard, Masatu, & Vialou, 2007)*. Absenteeism of profes-
sional staﬀ also is documented for health facilities in India
and for schools there and in East Africa (Banerjee & Duﬂo,
2006)^** (Tooley & Dixon, 2006)**. Even when professions
are well regulated, the eﬀect on performance of education,
professional qualiﬁcations, and training is complex and not
automatic. For example, more highly educated agricultural
extension agents in Kenya were found to have less, not more,
practical information than those with lower qualiﬁcations
(Leonard, 1977)*. Similarly the impact of supplemental train-
ing on medical quality has been found to be very modest (even
if positive) when not accompanied by other measures. Motiva-
tion to use what is learned is essential (Patouillard et al., 2007;
Peters et al., 2009; Shah et al., 2010)^**.
(a) Organizational incentives
The eﬀects of the incentives under which service staﬀ work
can be quite signiﬁcant—positively and negatively (Banerjee
& Duﬂo, 2006; Lagarde, Powell-Jackson, & Blaauw, 2010)^**
(Peeling & Holden, 2004)** (Basinga et al., 2011; Leonard,
1987; Leonard et al., 2007; Mliga, 2000)*. Where incentives
are too strong, health providers may supply too many inter-
ventions or drugs, to the point where these have no additional
beneﬁt or are even harmful (Berlan & Shiﬀman, 2011; Eldridge
& Palmer, 2009)^**. So achieving the correct balance between
incentives that increase eﬀort and those that induce “overtreat-
ment” is a challenge.
Where might the appropriate incentives come from?
(i) Undergoverned states manage their resources in ways
that provide only weak incentives. In other words, hirings,
promotions, good postings, and even praise, etc, are madein such a way as to reward eﬀort on the organization’s mis-
sion only to a modest degree, if at all (Banerjee & Duﬂo,
2006, 2010)^** (Rose, 2006)** (Leonard, 1977)*. This weak
incentive eﬀect is at odds with the considerable sums gov-
ernments expend for health, education, and animal disease
prevention and control.
(ii) Donors, acting through NGOs and other contractors,
also provide substantial resources but these often are man-
aged in a way that produces more incentive eﬀects than poor
governments achieve (Loevinsohn & Harding, 2005)*. The
direct eﬀects of donor interventions tend to be positive but
there can be indirect negative consequences as well on the
services that are not targeted (Cohn et al., 2010)^**.
(b) User payments
(i) User payments
Alternatively, the recipients of the services themselves might
provide inducements which, even if they only supplement the
much more substantial investments of governments and do-
nors, nonetheless provide incentives for quality eﬀorts that
matter to and are visible to them as consumers. Fees are not
inducements unless they add to the budget of the recipient
organization, of course. If they are transmitted into the na-
tional budget or substitute for it they are not inducements
or incentives—and that is the way most fees in government
facilities actually have been used (Das et al., 2008)** (Leonard,
1987, 2009; Mliga, 2000)*. On the other hand, informal fees
paid directly to service workers can exert greater power over
their behavior (Lewis, 2007)**, but are not easy to monitor.(ii) Feasibility of user payments by the poor
User payments raise the further question of whether the
poor have suﬃcient resources to have an incentive eﬀect. It
is a basic principle of economics that demand curves down-
ward in response to price and consumers will switch to cheaper
outlets for the same products or reduce consumption when
prices are raised. Certainly fees can be regressive and reduce
access for the poor (Berlan & Shiﬀman, 2011)^** (Leonard,
2000a)**. When Kenya suddenly eliminated fees for primary
education there was a dramatic increase in school enrollment,
making it obvious that cost had led many poor to forgo this
service for their children. The impact can be even greater for
services for which the beneﬁt may not be obvious (such as pre-
ventive measures) or services that are very expensive relative to
incomes, including hospital care for a serious illness (Lagarde
& Palmer, 2008)^**. Nonetheless, enough of the poor are will-
ing to commit suﬃcient resources so as to incentivize and
shape provider behavior—at least for services that impact
near-term catastrophic events (such as agricultural credit and
human and animal health), especially in countries in which
there is not substantial landlessness (Conning & Udry,
2007)**. 7 Most health care in LMICs is being provided in
fee-paying settings and even the poor are willing to pay for ac-
cess to providers who charge more than the lowest price when
they are persuaded they have a health condition that merits it
and that the higher-priced provider is the least expensive option
that can deal with the condition eﬀectively (Balabanova et al.,
2011)** (Leonard, 2009)*. The evidence for veterinary medi-
cine is even stronger, where modest payments can induce
attention from practitioners who otherwise would ignore the
poor (Leonard, 1987)*. For example, surveyed livestock hold-
ers in East Africa and the Philippines expressed a preference
for paid Community Animal Health Workers over free gov-
ernment workers (Catley et al., 2004; McLeod & Wilsmore,
2002; Sen & Chander, 2003)** and at least half the urban poor
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2006)** (Mehrotraa & Panchamukhia, 2006)*.
The issue here is not whether the poor deserve government-
subsidized services; they do. A large part of the fee-for-service
health care for the poor is in fact appropriately subsidized by
the government, not to speak of donors.
The point instead is that in actual practice even the very
poor are spending enough of their own funds on health care
and other rural services to inﬂuence the ways in which their
providers behave. We noted earlier that in most undergov-
erned LMICs even state employees in health, education, and
animal health in practice are deriving income from informal
payments from those they serve (Banerjee & Duﬂo, 2006; Ber-
lan & Shiﬀman, 2011)^** (Bloom et al., 2009; Lewis, 2007)**
(Leonard, 2000b)*. For example, government animal health
workers in India take private side-payments for their services
that are the same as the charges of purely private providers.
Government salary may well drive down the price for all ser-
vices (beneﬁting poorer consumers) but it also provides a
“rent” to the government service provider (Sen & Chander,
2003; Vian, 2008)** (Ahuja et al., 2000)*.
Nonetheless the institutional form in which these privately
delivered incentives are provided matters considerably.(c) Payments direct to individual providers
(i) Quantity
When fee income goes directly to the individual provider it
may do no more than stimulate quantity of eﬀort, not quality.
A systematic review of developed country literature on pay-
ment systems and physicians’ clinical behavior found some
evidence that primary care physicians provide a greater quan-
tity of primary care services under government or philan-
thropic fee-for-service payment compared with capitation
and salary (Gosden et al., 2000; Lagarde et al., 2010)^**. Public
or donor ﬁnancial incentives can stimulate delivery of services
for which demand is insuﬃcient, such as the delivery of immu-
nizations or screening tests. Similarly, conditional cash trans-
fers and other economic incentives targeting healthcare
recipients can increase the use of preventive services. However,
ﬁnancial incentives are more likely to inﬂuence discrete indi-
vidual behavior in the short run, and eﬀects in the long run
are unclear. They also can have unintended eﬀects, like cor-
ruption and making patients wary of the motives of the pro-
vider.
(ii) Quality
If they stimulate only quantity, fees for service contribute as
well to the widely observed tendency for “a race to the bot-
tom” among most practitioners by inducing activity at the
margin that is of limited or no value, rather than stimulating
higher quality (Chaix-Couturier, Durand-Zaleski, Jolly, &
Durieux, 2000; Lagarde et al., 2010; Oxman & Fretheim,
2008)^** (Gilson, 2006)*. 8 There are situations, such as animal
health services to pastoralists, where physical accessibility is
such an issue that quantity results are positive. 9
(iii) Contingent contracts
Direct payments may avoid a “race to the bottom” in some
settings because of their ability to write “outcome contingent
contracts”. In the case of midwives in Cameroun, as a delivery
is known to be successful shortly after birth, the payment of an
“appreciation” before leaving has a clear quality eﬀect (Ndeso-
Atanga, 2000)*. Outcome-contingent contracts are diﬃcult for
most forms of rural service, although one begins to approachtheir eﬀects when there are repeat transactions between the
parties over a considerable period (Leonard, 2007)*. 10
(d) Payments to organizations
It would appear that incentives (in the form of jobs, salaries,
bonuses, and spoken appreciation) that are mediated through
organizations are more likely than payments to individuals to
have a positive eﬀect on quality but only if the values of qual-
ity and service are institutionalized in the organization (Ox-
man & Fretheim, 2008; Shah et al., 2010)^** (Tibandebage &
Mackintosh, 2005)*. There are several components to this
proposition:
(i) Organizations have a greater ability to signal a commit-
ment to quality than practitioners do as individuals.
Because facilities have a physical and continuous presence
they are much more visible to the public and more subject
to public discussion than individual practitioners within
them (Leonard, 2007)*. For the same reason facility accred-
itation is somewhat more likely to be subject to review at
renewal (Ensor & Weinzierl, 2007)**.
(ii) Organizations have a greater ability to observe and
reward the performance of their staﬀ than individual users
of the service do. Because of information asymmetry indi-
vidual users do not always know when they are being badly
served. This is particularly the case in human and animal
health. A similar, even if somewhat smaller, imprecision
in user judgments about quality is also evident in educa-
tion. Particularly if the organization decentralizes person-
nel management to the facility level, it can make formal
or informal observations of the quality of the processes in
which its employees are engaged and has a wide array of
rewards and punishments it can apply relatively quickly. 11
(iii) Monitoring of the quality of individual practitioners
could be provided by regulation from government or pro-
fessional peers, overseeing individual practices. But even
in OECD countries regulation has been more eﬀective at
licensing (competence) than it has been at monitoring qual-
ity of eﬀort and has sometimes instead been used to protect
vested professional interests (Friedson, 1970)*. Regulation
of eﬀort is even weaker and has more potential to be nega-
tive in undergoverned LMICs (Patouillard et al., 2007)^**
(Ensor & Weinzierl, 2007; Peeling & Holden, 2004)**
(Kumaranayake et al., 2000)*.
(iv) Organizations that directly manage individual practi-
tioners are more likely (but still are not assured) to provide
eﬀective oversight and associated incentives, for they are
more likely than individuals to be able to signal their char-
acter and thus to beneﬁt from extra custom and increased
income through the provision of quality. Explicit incentive
payments may be paid to individual practitioners but it is
important that they be mediated by the group or organiza-
tion in its collective interest, not made directly (Acemoglu,
Kremer, & Mian, 2006; Chopra et al., 2008; Kremer &
Holla, 2008; Oxman & Fretheim, 2008; Shah et al., 2010;
Witter, Fretheim, Kessy, & Lindahl, 2012)^** (Bloom,
2011)*. 12
(v) Nonetheless, the costs to an organization of establish-
ing a reputation for institutional quality are signiﬁcant. It
appears from the preceding empirical evidence that the
returns to a reputation in additional or higher paying
custom are suﬃcient to maintain quality eﬀort but in them-
selves are not enough to induce most organizations to cre-
ate it. Thus the organizations that have invested in the
creation and maintenance of quality are more likely to have
had pre-existing “other-regarding”/altruistic values. There
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the public sector, particularly in the better-governed coun-
tries. For example, for democratic Brazil see: (Bebbington
& McCourt, 2007)*.
(vi) In the larger number of public entities in undergov-
erned states, however, quality values are insuﬃciently insti-
tutionalized or management is too inadequate to provide
eﬀective incentives to service employees, because of the
presence of weak incentives to managers and the pervasive-
ness of patronage (Leonard & et al., 2010)*. For example, a
randomized trial in Kenya found that primary school head-
masters refused to apply donor-ﬁnanced bonuses in an
incentive enhancing manner (Acemoglu et al., 2006)^**.
(vii) In otherwise diﬃcult environments value-led organi-
zations are exempliﬁed by the services of many Christian
missions in parts of Africa (Leonard et al., 2007; Ly,
2000; Mliga, 2000)* 13 and the Bangladesh Rehabilitation
Assistance Committee (BRAC) in South Asia (Standing
& Chowdhury, 2008)*. The presence or absence of such
value-driven organizations is a part of a country’s deep
institutional context, which contributes to path depen-
dence. Countries have diﬀerent institutional repertories
and thus will have diﬀerent tools available with which to
overcome their problems with information asymmetry.
But that inventory also might be changed by donors or
political initiatives that make the long-term, initially-costly
investments in new institutions.
(e) Contracting
The superior performance of values-led NGOs in undergov-
erned situations raises the question of whether contracting in
general or, more narrowly, social franchises 14 might be a
way to overcome the problems of government service organi-
zations. In one sense most of the mission health facilities in
Africa are operating under quasi-contracts, since they receive
government subsidies for their services. The real question then
is how easily organizations with similar performance charac-
teristics to these missions can be created from scratch and
whether they might even be private-for-proﬁt organizations?
It is clear that contracting can be used to expand access to ser-
vice facilities in remote areas that might otherwise not be
served (Lagarde & Palmer, 2009; Liu, Hotchkiss, & Bose,
2008)^** (Catley et al., 2004)** (Hellberg, 1990)*. The evidence
for improvement in the quality of service, however, is mixed in
general and for social franchises is inconclusive (Koehlmoos,
Gazi, Hossain, & Rashid, 2011; Koehlmoos, Gazi, Hossain,
& Zaman, 2009; Patouillard et al., 2007; Peters et al.,
2009)^** (Ensor & Weinzierl, 2007; Loevinsohn & Harding,
2005)**. It appears that most of the social franchises that are
not having an eﬀect are providing only training and have no
eﬀective regulatory discipline, which then would be consistent
with what is observed in other types of studies (Koehlmoos
et al., 2011)^**. It also seems that most of the franchises on
reproductive health have generated insuﬃcient revenue for
providers to want to absorb the costs of coordination and rep-
utation building (Bloom, Standing, & Lloyd, 2008)**. More
generally, contracting (including performance-based incen-
tives) can achieve quality improvements, but this is highly
dependent on the quality of the contract management (Liu
et al., 2008)^** (Eichler & Levine, 2008)**.
Contracting is a key aspect of the New Public Management
(NPM) and we do know that poor countries have rarely been
successful in writing and enforcing the well-speciﬁed
performance targets required to make such contracts work
(Larbi, 1999; Manning, 2001; Schick, 1998)** (Schick,1998)*. Unintended consequences of attaching ﬁnancial incen-
tives to performance targets are always a serious danger,
whether within or between organizations (Chaix-Couturier
et al., 2000; Lagarde & Palmer, 2009; Oxman & Fretheim,
2008; Petersen, Woodard, Urech, Daw, & Sookanan,
2006)^** (Eichler, 2006; Eichler & Levine, 2008)**. It is not
likely to be possible to overcome these problems unless the
contract is a relational one (and thus based on constant rene-
gotiation and hopes of many renewals)—and even then success
depends on willingness to use the ﬂexibility that the relation-
ship provides to enforce quality (Lo¨nnroth, Uplekar, & Blanc,
2006)^** (Eichler & Levine, 2008; Lo¨nnroth et al., 2006)**
(Mackintosh, Chaudhuri, & Mujinja, 2011; Palmer & Mills,
2005; Williamson, 1985)*. 15 Donor-ﬁnanced international
NGOs—which often have well-institutionalized values and a
reputation at stake—may well be able to write and enforce
contracts with high standards (as in the social franchise model)
but if the intention is then to continue these contracts through
governments with poor regulatory capacity, quality probably
will be hard to sustain. We hypothesize that only if external
contracts demanding high standards of service and profession-
alism are continued long enough for those values to become
institutionalized in the local NGOs that will receive the later
governmental contracts is quality likely to survive the transi-
tion. Of course local health and development organizations
that already have institutionalized such values will not require
the same lengthy and rigorous contract supervision.
(f) Commercial self-regulation
It is an open question as to when purely commercial inter-
ests would ﬁnd a proﬁt incentive to pursue a strong reputation
for quality or even seek collectively to assure standards. In cer-
tain circumstances business associations are able to substitute
for or complement the state in solving collective action prob-
lems, including setting standards for member ﬁrms. The per-
formance of these kinds of roles is most likely to be possible
when markets are competitive, encouragement is provided
by government, and the association itself has a dense member-
ship, oﬀers ﬁrms selective beneﬁts, and can mediate ﬁrm con-
ﬂicts over interests (Doner & Schneider, 2010)*.
(g) Generalities
The larger conclusions to draw from the multiple studies on
incentives for eﬀort are that poor consumers can use their pur-
chasing power to incentivise quality performance from service
agencies if they receive clear signals as to which are the good
providers. This power can be enhanced through conditional
cash transfers to the poor for their use of speciﬁc services
(Eichler & Levine, 2008)**. Generally, however, it is easier
for organizations than individuals to provide the appropriate
mix of monitoring, incentives, and signals. Client awareness
of how well a service provider is performing is not automatic;
mechanisms that are more eﬀective at signaling good processes
and outcomes are more likely to achieve this result. In almost
all cases, however, it takes time for clients to learn to read and
trust the signals sent by good performers and this implies the
involvement of service organizations willing to invest in long-
term results rather than immediate returns.7. MICRO-INSTITUTIONS: ACCOUNTABILITY
The preceding discussion of incentives has focused largely
on those that are provided by individual consumers or donors
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famous dichotomy, they are based on the client’s “exit” [refu-
sal to purchase] rather than “voice” [participation in gover-
nance] (Hirschman, 1970). What is the evidence about the
eﬀect of accountability to clients that is not mediated by the
market, in other words ones that involve citizen “voice”—
either local groups, decentralized governments, the regulatory
processes of the state, or other aspects of the institutional con-
text.
Accountability entails the identiﬁcation of responsible ac-
tors, the presence of information, and rewards or sanctions
(Brinkerhoﬀ, 2004; Collins et al., 2008)*. As with other aspects
of regulation and the assurance of service quality, accountabil-
ity is highly dependent on social context and is likely to evolve
most eﬀectively out of the institutional history of the society.
(a) Decentralisation
What forms of decentralized accountability strengthen the
performance of development services? To answer this question
we need to look at the diﬀerent dimensions of decentralization
as follows:
(i) Devolution: In general, devolution of the governance of
development services to elected community bodies or user
groups has produced weak results, most especially where
there are marked local inequalities or patronage (Leonard
& Marshall, 1982)**. There is evidence for this proposition
for general, multi-purpose local governments (Crook &
Sverisson, 2003; Harriss, 2001)*, health services (Berlan &
Shiﬀman, 2011)^** (Balabanova et al., 2011)**, agricultural
producer cooperatives (Kherallah & Kirsten, 2002; Peter-
son, 1982)** (Hyden, 1973)*, veterinary services (Catley
et al., 2004; Peeling & Holden, 2004)** and school commit-
tees in East Africa (Acemoglu et al., 2006; Banerjee &
Duﬂo, 2006)^**. The places where devolved institutions
have had a positive impact are those in which the commu-
nities themselves are relatively egalitarian, especially where
they are instruments for the villagers to overcome their rel-
ative inequality with the larger society (Bardhan, 2002)**.
(ii) Deconcentration: The forms of decentralization that
seem most eﬀective are ones in which the local operational
unit is not elected but has considerable managerial auton-
omy (i.e., deconcentration) combined with strong client par-
ticipation (Berlan & Shiﬀman, 2011; Rassekh & Segaren,
2009)^** (Balabanova et al., 2011)**. Thus the health facili-
ties in rural Tanzania that showed the highest quality were
those that were responsible for their own personnel and
ﬁnances (Mliga, 2000)*. And in Kenya experiments with
incentives for primary school teacher performance had
poor results when managed by headmasters who had no
control over other aspects of personnel or ﬁnances but
did work when secondary school scholarships were oﬀered
for students who did well on the national exams. The impli-
cation is that this beneﬁt provided a strong incentive to
pupils and parents who then both put pressure on teachers
and joined with them in mutually reinforcing co-production
(Acemoglu et al., 2006; Banerjee & Duﬂo, 2006)^**.
Put more generally, the strongest incentive eﬀects are in the
behavior of users both as consumers and co-producers of va-
lue, as mediated through professionally managed organiza-
tions (Eichler, 2006; Peters et al., 2009)^** (Eichler, 2006)**
(Ford et al., 2009; Loewenson, Rusike, & Zulu, 2004)*. Thus,
oversight by community organizations can improve health ser-
vices quality and make providers more responsive to consum-
ers/recipients. Berlan and Shiﬀman (2011)^** ﬁnd that while
practices that increase responsiveness toward other actorsrather than consumers (e.g., central government) can decrease
the quality of services, innovations that increase community
participation (e.g., through community health boards and
grassroots committees) and enhance consumers voice and
information can actually improve service quality as perceived
by consumers
(b) Eﬀective community participation
However, some ways of involving communities seem to be
more eﬀective than others, and their success in improving out-
comes is dependent on a variety of factors, including the
“design” of the group and the context in which it interacts.
Some of these factors are, for example: (i) the selection, com-
position, and general functioning of groups; (ii) relationships
between committee members, service workers, and service
managers; and (iii) the broader government context and so-
cio-cultural norms (Molyneux et al., 2012)^**. Community
organizations that respond to a felt local need, rather than
to one imposed by external actors are more likely to have po-
sitive results. In communities “where there are sharp divisions
based on ethnicity, wealth, gender, and power and where treat-
ment seeking involves very contrasting “traditional” and
“modern” health care, the applicability of community partici-
pation as envisaged through donors and governments can be
called into question” (Molyneux et al., 2012)^**. See also Rose
(2006)**.
The assessment of national NGOs as instruments of
accountability is mixed. Certainly civil society is not necessary
to poverty reduction, as there are authoritarian systems that
have achieved it. Nonetheless, there are settings in which
NGOs have played an important role in advocacy for the
poor. For example, BRAC has impressive achievements in
Bangladesh. Concerns remain, however, about whether most
NGOs are not too elitist and/or donor dependent, compromis-
ing their ability to be agents of empowerment for the poorest
(Bratton, 1989)*. The greater the degree of inequality in a soci-
ety, the more elitism would be a matter for concern (Edwards
& Hulme, 1996; Ibrahim & Hulme, 2010)** (Spicer et al.,
2011)*.
(c) Information
Public disclosure of information, consumers’ access to infor-
mation, and awareness of patients’ rights, all appear to be
powerful mechanisms for improving provider performance
and health outcomes. For example, provider performance re-
ports and report cards have potential to enhance responsive-
ness to consumers, and also increase consumers’ choice and
ability to dialog. Although not many reviews assess the impact
of report cards, there is some evidence showing that they can
contribute to improved provider performance (Berlan & Shiﬀ-
man, 2011; Molyneux et al., 2012)^** (Hansen et al., 2008)*.
However, their eﬀectiveness depends on design. Speciﬁcally,
the form of information matters: “consumers ignore raw data
and must be presented information in ways that are relevant,
comprehensive, and credible” (Berlan & Shiﬀman, 2011)^**.8. PATH DEPENDENCIES
At many points in our analysis we have noted that unique
sets of indigenous institutions have helped particular countries
overcome their asymmetric information problems. These insti-
tutions have derived from particular historical path of
development of each society. Countries, such as India and
INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS TO THE ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION PROBLEM IN HEALTH 81Pakistan, that have not yet discovered such facilitative institu-
tions in their cultural heritages struggle with providing the
quality of professional services their citizens seek. Christian
missions in Africa, BRAC in Bangladesh, and a reformist state
in northeast Brazil are well-documented examples of at least
partial institutional solutions. A less obvious example of path
dependent institutional success is provided by China’s health
care.
(a) China
China has a number of features that are unusual among
LMICs. Econometric analysis of the institutional determi-
nants of a country’s health status identiﬁes transition from
Communism as a negative inﬂuence, due to disruptions in
the health care system (Knowles & Owen, 2010)*. In contrast
the experience of post-Mao China has shown gradual transfor-
mation and improvement, even if medical costs have risen rap-
idly. This seemingly anomalous positive result can be
explained through path dependency in ways that are consistent
with the conclusion that quality is enhanced if incentives are
managed by values-led organizations rather than paid directly
to individual practitioners.
All facilities in China are dependent on fee income to sup-
plement government funds in order to pay adequate compen-
sation to their better professional staﬀ. Fee income is
aggregated at the level of the medical facility, not the individ-
ual, and is used by its management to provide incentives to its
professional staﬀ (Bloom, 2011)*. Both of these two attributes
are the same as observed in the better missions in Cameroun
and Tanzania (Leonard, 2009; Mliga, 2000)*. In contrast user
payments to government providers in India and Africa are fre-
quently informal in nature, and go directly to the individual.
The Chinese pattern has had a mixed eﬀect. Hospitals rely
heavily on the income they generate from patients and they
have strong incentives to provide an increasingly costly style
of care dependent on the sale of pharmaceuticals and use of
diagnostic equipment. On the other hand, these facilities have
remained in government ownership and they are under pres-
sure to demonstrate that they contribute to government health
targets (Pei & Bloom, 2011)*. For example, when the govern-
ment announced a policy for reducing maternal mortality,
some hospitals subsidized outreach work from their own rev-
enues, contributing to substantial improvement in maternal
health. Hospital performance is, therefore, strongly inﬂuenced
by the way managers balance these competing pressures and
reﬂect this balance in the design of salary bonus schemes.
China tolerates a considerable amount of corruption but it
punishes harshly those who are charged. Indeed, there have
been periodic, severely punitive anti-corruption campaigns
since the early 1950s (Schurman, 1973)*. Those who violate
Communist Party standards on quality in the pursuit of private
gain know that they are taking a risk of severe punishment
(Bloom, 2011)*. All health facilities are required to sign an eth-
ical code and their behavior is monitored. There are also exam-
ples when a person’s death in a rural medical facility suggested
possible neglect or incompetence and her/his village descended
on it en masse and demanded compensation (Bloom, 2011)*.
These examples suggest an implicit, culturally embedded set
of regulatory and tort institutions in China that are much
stronger than those found in most other LMICs.
(b) Generalities
The institutional solutions the above countries have found
for overcoming the asymmetric information problem arevery diﬀerent from one another. They carry some features
that are recognizable in the literature we have reviewed in
the preceding sections and can be explained with general the-
ory. But the speciﬁcs were made possible by the particular
path of institutional development each country has tra-
versed—paths rooted in their social histories and political
economies.
We want to emphasize the use of the adjective “institu-
tional” in the preceding paragraph. The mechanisms and
societal features that were able to produce improved out-
comes in each case were embedded in that country, that is,
they were institutionalized by having come to be valued for
their own sake and therefore had staying power and social
eﬃcacy. Too much of the literature evaluating various mech-
anisms for managing professional service delivery takes no
account of whether they have achieved institutionalization.
Indeed a single country experimental study design cannot test
for the consequences of a mechanism’s social embeddedness,
because it cannot be manipulated randomly. This does not
invalidate the evaluations of these design and policy features,
for those things that work well before they have become
institutionalized are most likely to survive long enough to be-
come socially embedded and therefore still more eﬀective.
But this process does re-emphasize the importance, in mak-
ing policy and implementation decisions about professional
services, of taking advantage of a society’s existing institu-
tional repertoire of institutions and of working with rather
than against them.9. CONCLUSIONS
The important conclusions to draw from this review of the
literature are:
(1) The quality of services oﬀered to the poor in undergov-
erned LMICs is frequently seriously deﬁcient.
(2) In undergoverned countries it is better to focus on the
nature of the markets for health and development services
rather than on the public and private sectors. It is com-
mon in such LMICs for informal fees to be charged in
the public sector and for a very substantial proportion
(if not a majority) of services to be bought in a private
sector that varies widely in quality and proﬁt motive. In
these settings the so-called “public” and “private” sectors
are interpenetrated and often face the same institutional
issues within them.
(3) The poor have more knowledge about the quality of the
services on which they rely than is generally recognized, but
this information could be enhanced considerably through
societal institutions that help them solve the information
asymmetry problem they face.
(4) The likelihood of social institutions that mitigate
inequalities in knowledge about the quality of services
increase with GNP per capita, education, good governance,
and “social capital” while they decrease with inequality and
patronage.
(5) Most of the world’s poor live in LMICs in which
they can and do invest modestly in the purchase of
needed services and can be seen buying from higher cost
providers in the face of catastrophic events when they
judge that their quality is necessary, 16. This in no way
invalidates the case for subsidies for services for the
poor. Recognition of the reality of client payments, how-
ever, prompts a recognition that most LMICs do have
resources in their societies that could be spent more eﬀec-
tively to create stronger incentives for service providers
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comes if the market imperfections caused by information
asymmetry could be overcome.
(6) Hence the priority is to develop a set of institutions
in the society that enable quality in competence, eﬀort,
and accountability to be rewarded and signaled.
(7) In societies with high levels of governance, the state
usually plays a central role in providing institutional solu-
tions to the problems of information asymmetry. It is very
often unrealistic and counter-productive, however, to
expect government to be the principal provider of individ-
ualisable (“private”) health and development goods for
the poor in countries with low levels of governance and
poorly developed paths for public sector improvement.
Nonetheless, even in these settings most often the state will
want to play a role in planning for, facilitating, and subsi-
dizing institutional solutions by non-governmental actors
and to ensure the provision of services that have important
“externalities” (such as disease prevention, surveillance,
and control).
(8) In undergoverned countries the most eﬀective institu-
tions serving the poor generally will be developed in orga-
nizations rather than by individual practitioners, as the
former are more likely to be able to overcome the asymmet-
ric information problem.
(9) In many societies the organizations that are most likely
to invest in the creation aswell asmaintenance of quality rep-
utations are those that have “other regarding” initial institu-
tional values.
(10) These organizations also are likely to perform best if
their local professional staﬀ have decentralized control of
their personnel and ﬁnancial management (deconcentra-
tion), under the eye of client participation.(11) As there are multiple ways to provide incentives for
quality and to signal them to potential clients, those trying
to stimulate higher quality should invest in the paths to
these institutions that are most consistent with a society’s
other existing institutions.
(12) These conclusions about institutional solutions to the
asymmetric information problem apply not just to health
services but to those for education, veterinary medicine,
agricultural credit, and probably others as well.
Diﬀerent social institutions for providing and signaling
incentives for quality in competence, eﬀort, and accountabil-
ity have been found to be eﬀective in various settings. The
evidence suggests that macro contextual factors such as cul-
tural norms and values matter for service outcomes, particu-
larly on how they determine the performance of community
accountability mechanisms, on how they shape provider–reci-
pient relationships and in the repertoire of well-performing
organizations (including government) available (Berlan &
Shiﬀman, 2011; Molyneux et al., 2012)^**. It is possible that
some of them are universally more eﬀective than others.
But because such institutions tend to be a cultural attribute
of a country as a whole (as missions are in Africa, for exam-
ple), the evidence for judging such relative eﬀectiveness does
not exist and would be diﬃcult to collect. More important,
such institutions generally are shaped in a path dependent
manner—that once moderately eﬀective institutions are
established in a society the costs of changing to another set
are too high to be worth the eﬀort (Bloom et al., 2009)**.
Thus improvements in the quality of services oﬀered to the
poor in LMICs are most likely to be found by using, extend-
ing, and reforming the particular institutions a country al-
ready has, rather than attempting to import some allegedly
universal “best practice”.NOTES1. The World Bank provides a Governance score for all countries, which
is a composite of scores on Voice and Accountability, Political Stability
and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Eﬀectiveness, Regula-
tory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. We are treating
countries at or below the median score as “undergoverned.”
2. For example, when we began this research we were puzzled as to how
in China after the end of the Cultural Revolution, when its medical
services came to rely on income from private payments, the health of its
population continued to improve, while other countries found privatiza-
tion produced a “race to the bottom” in quality. Between 1980 and 2010
the “Under 5 Mortality Rate” in China fell 72% from 65 to 18, while
India’s dropped only 64% from 177 to 63 (World Bank, 1997) and <http://
data.worldbank.org/indicator> for 2010.
3. This framework was originally developed by K.L. Leonard, in D.K.
Leonard, ed., 2000 and in K.L. Leonard, et al., 2007. It is paralleled and
validated by the framework of Capacity, Continuity, Catalysis, and
Context in Balabanova, Mills, and McKee (2011).
4. We did not restrict our searches to “undergoverned countries”, nor do
we apply our discussions of empirical ﬁndings only to such countries. Our
searches were directed at all poor countries and sometimes we even were
willing to pull in results from an industrialized country where no other
evidence was available on a key point. Our focus on “undergoverned
countries” in the following discussions comes from the fact that most of
the world’s poor are located in such countries and we therefore cannot
assume that the solution to their problems is good governance (i.e., a well–functioning set of state organisations). Thus we need to look at the
institutions governing market transactions for these services, even in
countries where governments are service providers.
5. The NIE has its origins both in transaction cost economics and the
organization theory of political scientists Herbert Simon and James
March. It is reﬂected in various degrees by Douglas North (economic
historian), Oliver Williamson and George Akerloﬀ (economists), and
Elinor Ostrom (political scientist).
6. If one makes a distinction between health practitioners with formal
qualiﬁcations and “informal” providers, government services usually are
back in the majority (Basu, Andrews, Kishore, Panjabi, & Stuckler,
2012)^**. But the “informal” providers are not always inexpensive and they
are competing successfully in the health market. And even “free”
government primary education often involves payments for uniforms,
supplies, and instructor tutoring (Tooley & Dixon, 2006)**, while
government MDs in India in the morning provide free “public” referrals
to their own “private” fee-paying clinics in the afternoon, making the
“public”/”private” distinction opaque.
7. The extensive literature on rural credit follows Amartya Sen in noting
that the poor are better able to survive and recover from modestly severe
adverse events when they have access to land, for it gives them capital
against which they can borrow (Conning & Udry, 2007)**. The latter point
may be one of the factors that combine to explain the greater quality in the
fee-for-service markets of China and with church providers in Africa than
there is for India or Pakistan, where wide-spread landlessness makes
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1983). Research to conﬁrm this hypothesis for services other than rural
credit is missing, however. We do have some evidence that those who
charge fees discriminate positively toward the poor (i.e., charge only as
much as they think they are able to pay), so that the burden on the poor of
fees may not be as great as is usually feared (McLeod & Wilsmore, 2002)**
(Amin, Hanson, & Mills, 2004; Leonard, 1987)*.
8. The debate about the eﬀects of private payments on the quality of
services is usually conducted as a comparison of publicly and privately
owned and managed facilities. But private payments are quite common in
the public sector of undergoverned countries and the private sector to
which comparison is made may or may not include both the formally
qualiﬁed practitioners in proﬁt-seeking and charitable settings as well as
the untrained operating informally. Health studies that use an undiﬀer-
entiated deﬁnition of “private” and assume that all government services
are outside the market suggest that public quality is better (Basu et al.,
2012)^**. But this ignores the impact of formal qualiﬁcations on quality we
acknowledged above and that some of these diﬀerences are so visible that
we must assume that consumers are making conscious choices between
them. Our reading of the literature is that the public v. private ownership
debate is obscuring many other important institutional factors, such as the
nature of the service “contract”, the organizational setting, and social
context in which the service is being delivered (Das & Hammer, 2007)
(Dulleck et al., 2011)*.
9. Most private payments in LMICs for veterinary medicine are directed
to individuals, which is similar to what public sector physicians are
collecting in after-hours private practices in India (Leonard, 1987)*. In the
animal health case we know that the increased access provided by the
larger quantity of service stimulated by fees was of suﬃcient quality as to
have identiﬁable positive eﬀects on animal mortality (Catley et al., 2004;
Peeling & Holden, 2004)**.
10. For instance, a study in rural China documents how local account-
ability networks (guanxi) put pressure on village doctors to take the needs
of patients into account but have much less inﬂuence on high-level
facilities. For example a doctor may have to refund the cost of drugs if
they do not work (Fang, 2008)*.
11. This point is well established in organisation theory. In the language
of the New Institutional Economics the organisation has the ability to
oﬀer “budget-breaking”/”non-conservative” institutions. A “conserva-
tive” institution is one, such as fees or tort settlements, where what one
party pays the other gains – conserving value. Such an institution has
disadvantages when the link between the provider’s actions (outputs) and
the outcomes experienced by the consumer are not automatic. A
“conservative” set of court-enforced torts thus might lead to a malpractice
suit where nothing was done wrong and no suit at all when errors were
made but the patient avoided injury by chance. A “non-conservative”institution does not require a direct link between a charge or compensa-
tion for the patient and a bonus or penalty for the individual provider.
Thus the employing organisation might sanction or reward the behavior of
its practitioners, even when there was no feedback from the recipients.
This latter type of institution permits more rigorous assessment of
professional quality by the organisation itself, independent of the
probabilistic element of outcomes (Leonard, 2000a). The classic article
on this point says: “In a well-known paper, Alchian and Demsetz (1972)
argue that eﬃciency can (and will) be restored by bringing in a principal
who monitors the agents’ inputs. My ﬁrst point will be that the principal’s
role is not essentially one of monitoring. ... the principal is needed, either
to enforce the penalties or to ﬁnance the bonuses. Thus, the principal’s
primary role is to break the budget-balancing constraint” (Holmstrom,
1982)*.
12. In the language of the New Institutional Economics, the nature of the
goods being provided in many of these health and development services is
such that local “hierarchies” are needed to mediate between the market
and the consumer if quality is to be delivered, even to those who want it.
Williamson would say the local organization thus has “asset speciﬁcity” in
two regards – the selection and management of its employees, and the
market value of its reputation, which it can create more easily than the
individual practitioner because of long repeated transactions with
consumers/clients (Williamson, 1975, 1984)*. Where there are strong
information asymmetries these attributes lead to a preference in under-
governed societies for local “hierarchies” over against disaggregated
“markets” as a form of economic organization (See also the last chapter in
(Leonard, 2000a)*.
13. A dissent to this view is provided by (Berendes, Heywood, Oliver, &
Garner, 2011)**, but the supporting table is no longer available on the
web.
14. Social franchises are a contractual arrangement between a franchisee,
usually a small business, and a franchisor, usually a larger organisation or
business, to provide a standardized service or product according to
guidelines set by the franchisor. In health, the franchisor is commonly an
international NGO receiving donor ﬁnancing to establish and run the
network (Montagu, 2002).
15. The Balanced Score Card method of evaluating contract perfor-
mance has had positive results in Afghanistan. But this was done with
donor funds and American and Indian technical assistance, leaving us still
with the critique applied to the NPM – that well-speciﬁed performance
targets are hard to develop and enforce in conditions of weak governance
(Anonymous, 2008; Hansen et al., 2008; Peters et al., 2007)*.
16. We hypothesize particularly if they have land or some other collateral
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Sources
Search engines/hosts: Science Direct, MedLine, PubMed,
JSTOR, and EBSCO (the selection of these hosts was
guided by the aim of reaching not only health literature,
but also Economics, Development Studies, and Public
Administration literature).
Systematic review websites, EPOC—Cochrane
Collaboration.
www: Google and Google Scholar.
Speciﬁc Journals: Lancet, World Development, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, Social Science and Medicine, and
Tropical animal health and production.
Search terms
Health AND Review AND—Institutions—Accountabil-
ity—Legitimacy– Partnerships—Community—Regula-
tion—Governance—Incentives—Faith based—Non-state
INSTITUTIONAL SOLUTIONS TO THE ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION PROBLEM IN HEALTH 87actors—Public Private—Market—Franchise—Decentral-
ization—Trust—Sanctions—Medical Malpractice—Infor-
mation Disclosure—Pharmaceuticals Regulation.
Finance AND Review AND: Institutions—Innovation—
Informal Finance—Credit—Curb Market—Regulation—
Innovations.
Education AND Review AND: Institutions—Public—Pri-
vate –Regulation, Non-state, Accountability].
Information Asymmetry AND Review (AND Institutions)—
Moral Hazards—Adverse selection.
Performance/Outcome/Results Based management—Pay
for performance.
Civil Service Reform AND Review, public sector perfor-
mance AND Review.
Veterinary Services—Animal Health—Private—Market—
Review.Methodology
Quality: We ﬁrst looked for Systematic Reviews, and then
prompted by the Realist Review critique (Pawson et al.,
2005), we widened the criteria to include other compara-
tive reviews that met the standards for quality of the
respective social science disciplines. The strategy was to
include the best evidence available (and not to fall into
the statement “we know nothing”, so common in system-
atic reviews).
Regions: Searches were limited to Developing countries—
low and middle-income countries—Africa—Asia—Latin
America.
Date: 2000 onwards (although the reviews covered articles
from earlier periods of course).
Language: English only.
